THE STORY OF THE MORTGAGE RETOLD
By JAcoB

3. RABINOWITZt

In their History of English Law, Pollock and Maitland speak of
the "Glanvillian and Bractonian mortgages" as representing two distinct stages in the development of the English law of mortgages.1 On
the basis of an obscure passage in Glanvill they concluded that, at the
time when Glanvill's treatise was written, a forfeiture of gaged land by
the gagor, in case of failure on his part to pay the mortgage debt on the
due date, could be validly effected by an appropriate provision to that
effect in the mortgage agreement, and that in the absence of such a provision the gagee could enforce a forfeiture by a proceeding in court.
The Glanvillian mortgage was, according to Pollock and Maitland, one
in which a forfeiture was either expressed or implied, and in the latter
case the gagee had to have recourse to what we might call a foreclosure
proceeding in order to enforce a forfeiture. The "Bractonian mortgage," they assert, took the form of a lease for a definite period of time,
with a provision that upon failure on the part of the gagor to pay the
debt at the end of the period fixed in the mortgage instrument the land
was to become the property of the gagee absolutely.
As to the "classical English mortgage" in the form of an absolute
conveyance with a condition subsequent, Pollock and Maitland are
apparently of the opinion that it came to the fore in the fourteenth century only, by reason of the fact that the lawyers of that time found it
difficult to square the notion of a term of years swelling into a fee with
2
their ideas of seisin.
The writer proposes to show that neither in the twelfth nor in the
thirteenth century could a forfeiture be effected either by agreement
between the parties or by a proceeding in court, as in the so-called "Glanvillian mortgage ;" that a term of years could not be converted into a
fee by nonpayment of the mortgage debt, as in the so-called "Bractonian
mortgage ;" that Pollock and Maitland failed to take fully into account
a very potent influence upon the development of English law during the
period under discussion, namely the influence of Hebrew law and legal
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forms; and that English mortgages of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were patterned after similar Jewish forms and devices.
These great historians of English law were apparently aware of
the possible influence of the Jews upon the development of English law,
but, lacking a knowledge of Hebrew law, they were unable to undertake
an investigation of this influence. In a significant passage they say:
"Whether the sojourn of the Jews in England left any permanent mark upon the body of our law is a question that we dare
not debate, though we may raise it. We can hardly suppose that
from the Lex Judaica the Hebrew law which the Jews administered
among themselves, anything passed into the code of the contemptuous Christian. But that the international Lex Judaismi
perished in 129o without leaving a trace of itself is by no means so
certain." 3
Whether or not English judges and lawyers of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries deliberately adopted rules and doctrines from
Hebrew law is a question we need not discuss here. But the position
of the Jews in England during this period was such that it was almost
inevitable that they should have exercised an important influence upon
the development of English security devices and, through these devices,
upon the body of law which grew out of them.
The business of money-lending on a large scale, and with it the
means by which this business was carried on, was introduced into England by the Jews. There is hardly a phase of English medieval law,
connected with the creditor-debtor relationship, which has not been
influenced by Jewish practices and legal forms. The writer has shown
elsewhere 4 that the English recognizance is a Hebrew form, going back
to Talmudic times, which was adopted by Englishmen from the Jews
when the former learned the business of money-lending from the latter.
It has also been pointed out that the medieval English bond, in its essential features, is Jewish in origin. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated
that the provision, almost universally found in medieval English suretyship contracts, that the surety be bound as a principal debtor is of
Jewish origin. 5 And finally, the writer has shown that the "classical
English mortgage" and the "penal bond" are much older than is commonly believed, that they were developed by the Jews and adopted by
their English imitators in the business of money-lending. 6 With all
3. 1 id. at 473.
4. In a paper entitled "The Influence of Jewish Law on the Development of the
Common Law," to be published in a volume on JEWS AND JuDAISm now in preparation under the editorship of Professor Louis Finkelstein.
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this in mind the writer has examined the various forms of mortgages
which prevailed in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
on the one hand, and the corresponding Hebrew forms, on the other,
and has found a remarkable similarity between them. But before discussing this similarity it may be well to consider the Pollock and Maitland classification of the medieval English mortgages.
The passages in which Glanvill speaks about the forfeiture of gaged
property occur in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of Book io of his treatise. In
Chapter 6, he says:
"Praeterea cum ad certum terminum res aliqua ponitur in
vadium aut ita convenit inter creditorem et debitorem quod si ad
terminum illum vadium suum non acquietaverit debitor ipse, tunc
vadium ipsum remaneat ipsi creditori, ita quod negotium suum
sicut de suo inde faciat aut nihil tale convenit inter eos. In primo
casu stabitur conventioni. In secundo, existente termino si fuerit
debitor in mora solvendi debitum, poterit se inde conqueri et institiabitur quod ad curiam veniat et inde respondeat, et per hoc
breve."
"In addition-when a thing is pledged for a definite period, it
is either agreed between the Creditor and Debtor, that if, at the
time appointed, the Debtor should not redeem his pledge, it should
then belong to the Creditor so that he might dispose of it as his
own; or no such agreement is entered into between them. In the
former case, the agreement must be adhered to; in the latter, the
term being unexpired, without the Debtor's discharging the Debt,
the Creditor may complain of him, and the Debtor shall be compelled to appear in Court, and answer by the following Writ." 7
In Chapter 7 he gives the form of a writ by which the debtor is
called upon to acquit the gage, and in Chapter 8 he states that if the
debtor comes to court and acknowledges the gage, he is given a reasonable time within which he is to acquit the gage, and upon his failure to
do so "dabitur licentia ipsi creditori de cetero negotium suum de vadio
ipso sicut de re propria facere quo modo voluerit." ' That is, "Liberty
shall be given to the Creditor, from that time, to treat the pledge as his
own property and do whatever he chuses with it."
The above passages occur in Glanvill's discussion of gages of personal property. The sentence introducing the subject begins: "Cum
itaque res mobilis ponitur in vadium." o But Pollock and Maitland
apparently base their conclusion as to the applicability of the same rules
to gages of land upon another passage in which Glanvill, after defining
7. "Existente termino. This is palpably false reading-it should be elapso termino,
the term being expired." Note ad locum in Beames' translation of GLANVILL, DE LE-iBus (1812).
8. GLANVILL,
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a "mortuum vadium" as a gage of land in which the profits from the
land are not applied by the gagee to the reduction of the debt, states:
"Cetera serventur ut prius de vadiis in rebus mobilibus consistentibus
dictum est." 10
While on its face the sentence last quoted seems to support the
Pollock and Maitland conclusion, a close examination of the entire
Glanvillian text dealing with gages 11 will reveal that the above sentence
is not to be taken at its face value. There are in this text several rules
which are obviously not applicable to gages of land. The rule that the
gagee is to keep the gage safely is one, that he is not to use it is another,
and that in case it is necessary to incur expenses the agreement of the
parties is to govern is still another. The general statement that the
rules applicable to gages of chattels are also applicable to gages of land
is therefore obviously inaccurate, and one cannot draw from it any conclusions as to whether or not the rules with regard to the forfeiture of
gaged property were applicable to gages of land.
If the passages in Glanvill dealing directly with the subject do not
give us any definite indication as to the applicability of the forfeiture
rules to gages of land, there are other passages which, though not dealing directly with the subject, seem to point to the conclusion that these
rules were not applicable to gages of land. 12 The mortgagee's seisin was,
according to Glanvill, a seisin "ut de vadio" and not a seisin "ut de
feodo." 1" In the case of a disseisin of the mortgagee by a stranger, the
former could not have a writ of novel disseisin. The mortgagor was
the only one to whom this writ was available in such a case. Similarly,
in the case of a disseisin of the mortgagee by the mortgagor, the former
could not have this writ, but was relegated to his remedy in an action
of debt. Now, if a forfeiture of gaged land was possible either by
agreement or by the order of the court, as Pollock and Maitland would
have us believe, a whole series of questions arises: Was the nature of
the seisin changed upon forfeiture from one "ut de vadio" to one "ut de
feodo"? Where a forfeiture was provided for by express agreement
was the gagee entitled to.a writ of novel disseisin in case he was disseised, either by the gagee or by a stranger, after the term of payment
of the mortgage debt had expired? And where a forfeiture was effected
by judgment of the court, did the court order an enfeoffment of the
gagee by the gagor? On what terms? How were the services to be
performed by the feoffee to the feoffor to be determined? Glanvill
would hardly have remained silent on these matters, if he meant
io. Id., ch. 8.
II. Id., ch. 6.
12. Id., bk. 13, ch. 26.
13. Ibid.
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to include land in his statement of the rule about a forfeiture of gaged
property. 14

Furthermore, if the gagee of land had a right to a forfeiture, it must
have depended upon his continuing in possession of the gaged land, for
if he was disseised, either by the gagee or by a stranger, he was, as we
have seen above, relegated to his remedy in an action of debt. It follows,
14. At this point the writer wishes to call attention to another misunderstanding
which arose from the vagueness of the Glanvillian text dealing with the mortgage.
Pollock and Maitland are of the opinion that under the "Glanvillian mortgage," when
the gagee was disseised of his gage either by the gagor himself or by a stranger, he
had no remedy whereby he could repossess himself of the gaged land, the writ of novel
disseisin not being available to him. All he could do was to bring an action of debt
against the gagor, in which action he could only recover a money judgment. This
anomalous position of the "Glanvillian gagee" was, according to Pollock and Maitland, the reason for the disajpearance of the "Glanvillian gage." To quote from their
HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) i2o-i:
"But of the practice described by Glanvill we know exceedingly little; it is
not the root of our classical law of mortgage, which starts from the conditional
feoffment. It seems to have soon become antiquated and the cause of its obsolescence is not far to seek. The gagee of Glanvill's day is put into possession of
the land. Unless the gagor has put the gagee into possession, the king's court will
pay no heed to the would-be gage. It will be one of those 'private conventions'
which that court does not enforce. So the gagee must be put in possession. His
possession is called a seisin, a seisina ut de vadio. For all, this, however, it is unprotected. If a stranger casts the gagee out, it is the gagor who has the assize.
But more; if the gagor casts the gagee out, the gagee cannot recover the land.
The reason given f~r this is very strange :-What the creditor is really entitled
to is the debt, not the land. If he comes into court he must come to ask for that
to which he is entitled. If he obtains a judgment for his debt, he has obtained the
only judgment to which he has any right.
"Now, if a court of law could always compel a debtor to pay his debt, there
would be sound sense in this argument. Why should a court give a man security
for money when it could give him the money? But a court cannot always compel
a debtor to pay his debt, and the only means of compulsion that a court of the
twelfth century could use for such a purpose were feeble and defective. Thus the
debtor of Glanvill's day could to all appearance reduce his gagee from the position of a secured to that of an unsecured creditor by the simple process of ejecting
him from the gaged land. Such a state of things can have been but temporary."
The writer believes that the assumption that in his action of debt the gagee could
only recover a money judgment is unwarranted. There are several entries in the Pipe
Rolls which clearly indicate that about Glanvill's time, that is at the beginning of the
reign of Richard I, the gagee was given a remedy for the'recovery of his gage. To
quote some of these entries: "Herueus de Weston debet iii m. pro habendo recto de
ix m. vel de vadio suo." Pipe Roll Society Publ. v. I (N. S.), p. 116. Hugo f. Lefivin et Willelmus de Buggeden r. c. de x m. pro habenda villa de Corneburc usque ad
terminum cruisiatorum sicut vadium suum. Pipe Roll Society Publ. v. 2 (N. s.), p.
76. Liulfus homo ducis Saxonie debet Lx m. ut habeat vadium suum de terra de
Stebbinge." Pipe Roll Society Publ. v. i (N. s.), p. ioS. Some ten years later
we find the following entry on the Pipe Rolls: "Willelmus de Keuill' et Nicolaus frater
eius debent x. li.pro habenda saisina maneriorum de Camel' et Hunesspil que Willelmus de Mariscis eis invadiavit, que eis adjudicata fuerunt esse vadia eorum." Pipe
Roll Society Publ. v. 12 (N. s.), p. 99.
In these cases the gagees obtained possession of the gaged land by judicial process,
and in one case at least the gagee demanded that either the debt be paid or that possession of the gaged property be delivered to him. This being so, the rule stated by
Glanvill that the gagor cannot have a writ of novel disseisin is not at all unreasonable
and technical. The writ of novel disseisin was available only to a party who claimed
the land absolutely, and claimed nothing else, while a gagor's claim was primarily for
money, and not for posession of the land. He claimed the land only as an alternative
to the claim for money, and not absolutely at that, but only for as long as the debt
remained unpaid. It was only reasonable therefore that the disseised mortgagee should
be given his remedy in an action of debt, and not by a writ of novel disseisin. We
still say to this day that a mortgage is incidental to the debt which it secures.
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therefore, that in every case where a gagee of land sought to enforce a
forfeiture the preliminary question of who was in possssion of the land
at the time the writ issued would have had to be decided before the court
could have given a judgment of forfeiture. Yet when Glanvill speaks in
detail about the possible issues that may arise between the gagor and
gagee when both apphar in court, he says nothing about the case in
which the gagor acknowledges the gage, but denies that the gagee
remains in possession. 15
So much for the internal evidence from the Glanvillian text itself.
Let us now turn to the evidence outside of the text. Pollock and Maitland state that they could not find the writ calling upon the debtor to
acquit the debt-that is the writ by which a forfeiture was enforcedeven in the earliest Registers.' 6 Now if the writ was applicable to land,
its absence from the Registers would be rather peculiar. But if we
should assume that it was applicable to chattels only, this absence could
be easily accounted for inasmuch as recourse to this writ must have been
very rare, since a loan on the security of chattels did not ordinarily
involve a large amount of money, and a royal writ was quite an expensive commodity in those days.
Another indication that a provision for a forfeiture was not valid
may be seen in the fact that Pollock and Maitland were apparently
unable to find a single document of the twelfth century, or of a later date
for that matter, in which there is a provision for a forfeiture. On the
contrary, some of the available twelfth century mortgages would seem
to indicate that a provision for a forfeiture was not considered valid in
the twelfth century. No. 509 in Madox' Formulare, for example, is an
agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee that within a period of
two and one-half years from the date of the instrument the mortgagor
or his brothers or nephew may redeem the property, and that if they do
not redeem within that period, the property is to remain to the
mortgagee in accordancewith his charter. Obviously, we have here a
case of the "classical English mortgage" in which an absolute charter
of feoffment was delivered by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, and an
instrument of defeasance or of the right of repurchase was executed by
the latter and delivered to the former. Again, in Pipe Roll 3 Ri. i we
find the following entry: "Prior de Kenillewurda debet c.s. pro habendo
judicio de Flechamsteda secundum cartas suas quas Templarii tenent." 1
Apparently, what happened here was that the owner of Flechamsteda
had mortgaged his property to the Prior and delivered a charter of
feoffment to the Templars, to be returned to him upon payment of the
15. GLANVILL, DE LEGrBus, bk. io, ch. 8.
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mortgage debt, or turned over to the Prior upon default in payment.
The writer has shown elsewhere 18 that such a delivery of the instrument of conveyance to a third party was the regular procedure employed
in what Pollock and Maitland call "the classical English mortgage" during the early stage of its development, and that the treasury of the
Templars was often used by the parties as the depositary in such conditional conveyances. If a provision for a forfeiture was valid in the
twelfth century, it is difficult to see why the parties should have gone
to the trouble of executing two instruments and, at least in one case,
delivering it to a third party, when they could have provided for a forfeiture in a single instrument.
Further evidence to the effect that a provision for a forfeiture was
considered invalid in England at a very early time is found in a document, dated 11:27, and contained in the Cartulary of the Monastery of
Ramsey. 9 This document, if the writer's interpretation of it is correct,
represents a mortgage in which a most ingenious method was used for
the purpose of effecting a forfeiture-a method which would do honor
to the most astute corporation lawyer in our own time. The instrument
recites that as a dispute had arisen with regard to certain land between
one William Wilard and the Abbot of Ramsey, the latter gave to the
former loo s. upon condition that if Wilard will repay the ioo s. at the
end of three years his claim to the land shall be as good as, "and better
not worse," as on the day when suit was commenced. If at the end of
the three years Wilard failed to repay the money, the Abbot was to hold
the land for another three years, and if at the end of the second threeyear period Wilard again failed to repay the money, he was to lose his
claim to the land.
In all probability this was just an ordinary mortgage, and the dispute was nothing but a fiction intended to cover up a provision for a forfeiture which would otherwise have been invalid. The circumstances
of the transaction definitely point in this direction. The sum of ioo s.,
which was paid by the Abbot to Wilard, was quite a substantial amount
in the early part of the twelfth century. Money was scarce, and he who
had it could dictate terms pretty much his own way to the one who
needed it. If, then, this had been a settlement of a real controversy, it
is hardly likely that the Abbot would have given Wilard the option of
repaying the money and reasserting his claim after the lapse of three
years, and a further option at the end of a second three-year period.
Furthermore, parties to a settlement, especially the one that has to part
18. See Rabinowitz, The Common Law Mortgage and the ConditionalBond (1943)
92 U. OF PA. L. RV. i79, i8o n. 5.
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with money, usually wish to make the settlement final, and do not wish
to leave the issue of the controversy in doubt.
The most amazing thing, however, about this transaction is that
it conforms with a certain rule of Hebrew law concerning forfeitures,
as stated in an early Talmudic text of the second century. This text
reads as follows:
"Where two individuals were involved in litigation, and one
said to the other: 'If I do not come within 30 days you shall have
in m'y hands so much', and the other demanded that much, R. Jose
says: 'the condition shall stand', and R.Judah says: "how does
he become entitled to that which has not come into his hands, the
condition is not valid.' Where one delivered his house or his field
to another in pledge for a loan of money, and said to him: 'If I
do not repay you from now until such a day, I shall have nothing
in your hands', and the time arrived and he did not pay, R. Jose
says: The condition shall stand'. R. Judah says: 'How does he
become entitled to that which is not his, the condition is not valid'.
R. Judah admits, however, that in the case where two individuals
were contending over a house or over a field, and one of them said
to the other: 'If I do not come from now until such a day, I shall
have nothing in your hands,'20 and the time arrived and he did not
come, he has lost his claim."
It thus appears from the above text that according to R. Judah a
provision for a forfeiture is not valid, unless the ownership of the property to be forfeited is in dispute, and one of the parties to the dispute
stipulates for a forfeiture in favor of the other. It should be added here
that R. Judah's opinion is the one that prevails according to the
Talmudists.
It will readily be seen that the method of providing for a forfeiture,
which was used in the English mortgage discussed above, corresponds
exactly to the hypothetical case put by R. Judah, in which, he admits, a
provision for a forfeiture is valid. Indeed, there is a very close, and to
the writer's mind very significant, similarity between the phraseology
of the condition as stated by R. Judah, and that of the English mortgage. Nowhere is a word denoting payment, such as "solvere" or
"persolvere" mentioned in the English instrument. "Si non venerit,
afferens quae supradicta sunt, sciat se perdidisse omnem calumniam,"
reads the forfeiture clause in that instrument. Wilard is to "come and
bring" the money, exactly as in the Talmudic text, "If I do not come."
Furthermore, the entire form of the instrument is rather peculiar. It
does not speak in the first person, as English documents of the Middle
Ages usually do. It is not a grant or demise by Wilard, but is rather
20. Tosefta, ed. Zuckermandel (Jerusalem, 1937) p. 372.
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an attestation by the court of a stipulation entered into before it by the
parties to a suit. It speaks in the third person, "in hoc breviculo osten'dit . . . sciat se perdidisse." This feature of the instrument, too, is in
remarkable agreement with Hebrew law on the subject of forfeitures.
There is an important body of opinion among post-Talmudic authorities holding that R. Judah's statement about the validity of a forfeiture
provision where the property to be forfeited is in dispute has reference
to a case in which the provision was embodied in a stipulation made
21
before a prominent court in connection with the conduct of a trial.
The writer believes that the parallelism between the above English
mortgage and the rules of Hebrew law with regard to forfeitures is so
close that it is hardly possible to ,explain it away as a mere coincidence.
We seem to be dealing here with a pattern shaped on the basis of a whole
series of rules, exceptions to the rules, and modifications of these exceptions. Such patterns do not come into existence by accident. It is
quite likely that the Abbot followed an example set by the Jews, or that
he obtained the advice of a Jewish expert in the money-lending business
before he advanced the money. Be that as it may, the fact that the parties had to resort to an elaborate fiction in order to provide for a forfeiture in a legally valid manner shows that ordinarily a provision for a
forfeiture was not considered valid.
What has been said above about the invalidity of a forfeiture provision in Glanvill's time applies with equal force to what Pollock and
Mailtland call the "Bractonian mortgage." The law was not changed
in this respect between the time of Glanvill and that of Bracton. But a
few words must be added about the documents which Pollock and
Maitland cite as examples of the "Bractonian mortgage." An examination of these documents will reveal that they do not quite represent
what these great historians of English law claim they represent. No.
509 in Madox has already been discussed by the writer. It is an example of the "classical English mortgage" in its earlier stage of development, in which two documents, a charter of feoffment and an instrument of defeasance, were used. No. 230 in Madox is a lease by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee for a period of fifteen years at a rental of
sixpence a year. The instrument provides that if at the end of the
fifteen-year period the mortgagor fails to pay the debt, the mortgagee is
to hold the property from year to year at the original rental. The land
was not to become theproperty of the mortgagee absolutely upon default
by the mortgagor. He was only to hold it from year to year until the
debt was paid. The mortgagor's right to redeem the property at the
end of any year continued indefinitely. This, if anything, tends to show
21. See Rabbi Isaac Alfasi on Baba Bathra, ch. io.
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that a forfeiture clause was not considered valid, and that a term of years
could not be changed into a fee by the mortgagor's default. The same
is true of the document cited by Pollock and Maitland from-Chron. de
Melsa 1.22 Upon default by the mortgagor at the end of a period of
thirty years the mortgagee was to hold the property from year to year
at a fixed rental.
The Yearbook case cited by them 23 may have been one of a "classical English mortgage," with an absolute charter of feoffment and an
instrument setting forth the exact terms of the mortgage. The defendant in his answer in that case probably referred to the latter instrument,
which usually recited that if the debt was not paid at the end of the
term fixed by the parties, the property was to remain to the mortgagee,
but that if it was paid, the property was to revert back to the mortgagor.
The same is true of the document cited by them from Guisborough
Cartulary. 24 This document was probably accompanied by a charter
of feoffment. At any rate, the document does not represent a "Bractonian mortgage" in the form of a lease for a term of years, with a pro.
vision that upon failure on the part of the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt at the end of the term the property is to belong to the mortgagee absolutely. For, in the first place, it appears that the property
was not demised to the mortgagee for a term of years. There are no
words of demise anywhere in the document. The operative words used
are "obligavi et impignoravi." Also, there is a provision in the document that the mortgagor should not sell the property to anyone, except
the mortgagee, in case he should not wish "to hold it in his hand," which
seems to indicate that the mortgagor remained in possession. Again,
the fact that there is no provision for a deduction from the principal
amount of the loan for the use of the property indicates that the mortgagee was not in possession, for if he had been, the transaction would
have been a "mortuum vadium," a species of usury according to Glanvill.
It is true that the texts dealing with the subject in Bracton's treatise 2' do seem to support the Pollock and Maitland conclusion. But it is
likely that Bracton left out of account the absolute charter of feoffment,
which was part of every mortgage in which the mortgagee was to
become the owner of the mortgaged property in case of default by the
mortgagor. He had in mind only the document setting forth the terms
of the mortgage, and this document, standing alone, does seem to have
the effect of turning a term of years into a fee. He may have been
Page 303.
23. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. i898) 122.
22.

case is found in Y. B. 21-2 EDw. I, p.
24. Page i44.
25. Bracton, fol. 20, 268-9.
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prompted to overlook the charter of feoffment by a desire for logical
symmetry, for in the same passage in which he speaks of a term of years
being turned into a fee by a condition he also speaks of a fee being turned
into a term of years by a condition.
A very strong indication that Bracton's text is not to be taken at its
face value may be found in the fact that in all of the entries in the printed
Close Rolls, recording mortgages during the latter part of the reign of
Henry III, the transaction takes the form of two separate instruments:
an absolute charter of feoffment, and a document setting forth the terms
of the mortgage. 26 A diligent search of these rolls by the writer has
failed to uncover a single case in which a term of years was to be turned
into a fee without the aid of an absolute charter of feoffment, executed
by the mortgagor simultaneously with the execution of the document
setting forth the terms of the mortgage.
We now come to a consideration of the various types of mortgages
found in the Talmud and other Hebrew sources, and their English counterparts. The outstanding feature of the Talmudic law of mortgages
is that a provision for a forfeiture of the mortgaged property upon default by the mortgagor is not valid.27 There were, however, ways of
evading this rule against forfeitures. The usual method by which what
amounts to a forfeiture was effected under Hebrew law was as follows:
the mortgagor would convey the property to the mortgagee absolutely,
and the mortgagee, on his part, would undertake to return the property
to the mortgagor upon repayment, within a specified period, of the
money advanced by him to the mortgagor. The mortgagor's conveyance and the mortgagee's undertaking would be embodied in two separate instruments, and both instruments would be delivered to a third
party, to be turned over to the mortgagee or returned to the mortgagor,
as the case may be, at the end of the period specified in the agreement
between them.
The writer has shown elsewhere 28 that this type of mortgage, in
all of its essential features, such as the use of two separate instruments
and the delivery of these instruments to a third party, was adopted by
the English from the Jews, and that it gave rise to what Pollock and
Maitland call the "classical English mortgage," which is still in use
throughout England and the United States. In this paper the writer
will discuss several types of mortgages, other than the one just
mentioned.
26. See, e. g., Calendar of the Close Rolls, 1261-1264, pp. 310-311; 1264-1268, pp.
1o5, 385-386, 391-392, 525.
27. For a full discussion of the subject and citation of authorities see Rabinowitz,
The Common Law Mortgage and the Conditional Bond (1943) 92 U. OF PA. L. REv.
179.
28. Ibid.
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The pledge of land with delivery of possession to the creditor was
in common use among the Jews at a very early time. A wide variety of
gages of land with delivery of possession to the gagee is discussed in the
Talmud, tractate Baba Metzia,2 9 in the chapter dealing with the laws of
usury. The connection between these gages and the usury laws is to be
found in the fact that in many cases the gaging device was used for the
purpose of evading these laws. The principal types of gage mentioned
in the Talmud are:
(i) A gage for a specified term, during which the gagor is precluded from paying the debt and redeeming the property.
(2) A gage of indefinite duration, under the terms of which the
gagor may at any time pay the debt and redeem the property.
(3) A gage with deduction, under the terms of which the gagee
deducts from the principal a certain amount, usually smaller than the
normal rental or income from the property, for the use of the property.
(4) A gage without deduction, in which no deduction is made
from the principal for the use of the property.
(5) "Kitzutha," a gage in which for a specified period of time the
gagee is to deduct a certain amount from the principal, after which
period the entire income from the property is to be deducted from the
property.
(6) "Mashkantha of Sura,"a gage under the terms of which the
entire debt is to be extinguished at the end of a specified period of time
in exchange for the gagee's use of the land.
From the point of view of the usury laws there is a difference of
opinion among post-Talmudic authorities as to the effect of these various
types of gage. According to the French school represented by Rashi 8
and Rabbenu Tam,"' types (3), (5), and (6) are wholly free from the
taint of usury, while (4) is only quasi-usury-"abak ribbith," literally
the dust of usury and is prohibited only by Rabbinical law, and not by
Pentateuchal law. Others hold that type (3) is also usurious, and that
only (5) and (6) are not; and still others are of the opinion that the
only type of gage which is wholly free from usury is (6), under which
the debt is entirely extinguished at the end of a specified period.82
With regard to quasi-usury, the rule is that although the lender
commits a moral transgression, the temporal courts will, nevertheless,
not intervene to invalidate the transaction and compel the lender to
return to the borrower what he has received from him by way of usury.
29. Fol. 67a-68a.
30. Baba Metzia, fol. 67b, s. v. Beathra.
3. Tosaphoth on Baba Metzia, 67b, s. v. Rvina.
32. See Rabbi Asher b. Yehiel on Baba Metzia, fol. 67a-68a.
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A comparison of these Talmudic gages with the Glanvillian
"vadium" will reveal a close correspondence between them. Glanvill
speaks of the "vadium ad terminum," the gage of land for a term, and
the "vadium sine termino," the gage without a term. 33 Pollock and
Maitland apparently interpret the text in Glanvill to mean that under
the "vadium ad terminum" the lender may not demand the repayment
of the loan before the expiration of the term, while under the "vadium
sine termino" he may do so at any time.34 However, the plain meaning
of the text is that the term has reference to the mortgage and not to the
loan. The difference between a mortgage with a term and one without
a term, therefore, consists in the fact that under the former the mortgagor may not redeem the land by paying the mortgage debt before the
expiration of the term, while under the latter he may do so at any time.
It may readily be seen, by a reference to the Talmudic gages enumerated
above, that Glanvill's "vadium ad terminum" and "vadium sine
termino" are the exact counterparts of types (i) and (2), respectively,
of these gages.
Again, in the same book, Glanvill speaks of the "mortuum vadium,"
and explains the same as a gage under the terms of which no deduction
from the principal is made by the lender in favor of the borrower for
the use of the land by the former during the term of the gage. 35 This
is obviously type (4) of the Talmudic gage. Type (3) is not specifically mentioned by Glanvill, but is clearly implied in his definition of
the "mortuum vadium." "Mortuum vadium dicitur illud cujus fructus
vel redditus interim percepti in nullo se acquietant." From this it fol*lows that where a deduction is-made, even though it is less than the full
value of the income from the land, the transaction is not a "mortuum
vadium."
Pollock and Maitland apparently did not give the proper weight to
the words "in nullo" in Glanvill's definition of the "mortuum vadium."
They are therefore of the opinion that, according to Glanvill, the only
type of gage which was wholly free from the taint of usury was the one
in which the entire income from the property was deducted from the
principal of the loan. Having failed to find instances of such gages in
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they concluded that the sin of usury
involved in the "mortuum vadium" was disregarded by money-lenders.
To quote from their History of English Law:
"The specific mark of the mortgage is that the profits of the
land received by the creditor are not to reduce the debt. Such a
bargain is a kind of usury; but apparently it is a valid bargain, even
33.
34.
35.

GLANVILL, DE LAiBus, bk. io, ch. 6.
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d
GLANVILL, DE LEGIBUS, bk. io, ch. 8.

ed. 1898)
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though the creditor be a Christian. He sins by making it, and, if
he dies in his sin, his chattels will be forfeited to the king; but to
all seeming the debtor is bound by his contract. .

.

.

Even the

Christian, if we are not much mistaken, was very willing to run
such risk of sin and punishment as was involved in the covert usury
of the mortgage. The plea rolls of the I 3 th century often show us
a Christian gagee in possession of the gaged land, but we have come
upon no instance in which he was called upon to account for the
profits that he had received." 81
However, a close examination of some of the available thirteenth
century mortgage instruments will reveal that in form at least moneylenders did not disregard the sin and risk involved in the "mortuum
vadium." There is a provision in these instruments for some deduction, however small and normal, for the use of the property. In No.
230, Madox, Formulare Anglicanum, which has already been mentioned, the gagee was to deduct sixpence per year, and in Chronicles de
Melsa, the deduction was one of one shilling per year. 7 These mortgages were therefore similar to type (4) above of the Talmudic gage.
A comparison between No. 230 in Madox and the standard
Hebrew gage with deduction, given in the formbook of Rabbi Jehudah
Barzillai 31 (1 ith century, Spain) is particularly illuminating in this
respect. There is an almost complete identity of pattern between the
two. In the Madox instrument the land was delivered to the gagee for
a period of fifteen years at a rental of sixpence per year, with a provision that upon failure on the part of the gagor to pay the debt at the end
of that period the gagee was to hold the property from year to year at
the same rental until he was paid in full. In the Barzillai form the gage
is similarly given for a definite period of time, with a fixed annual deduction by way of rent, and with a provision that in case of default the gagee
is to hold the property from year to year at the original rental until he is
fully paid.
A truly remarkable parallelism between the Talmudic law of mortgages and the English law on the same subject, as laid down by Glanvill,
is to be found in the passage in which the latter speaks of the usurious
character of the "mortuum vadium," where he says that although the
"mortuum vadium" is a species of usury it is not prohibited by the king's
court .3

This is obviously in complete agreement with the view of the

Talmud, as interpreted by the French school of commentators, on a
mortgage without deduction. The transaction according to the,
36.

2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWv

37. Vol. I, p. 303.
38. Form No. 42.
39. GLANmVLL, DE LEGmiBS, bk. IO,ch. 8.

(2d ed. 1898) ug.
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Talmud, is quasi-usurious and involves a sin, but does not involve a
legal wrong which would warrant the intervention of a temporal court.
An interesting variation of type (5) of the Talmudic gage is found
in an English mortgage, dated 1190.40 According to the terms of this
mortgage a certain sum was to be deducted from the principal annually
until the twenty-fifth year, that is, during the first half of the term of
the mortgage, which was made for a period of fifty years. After the
twenty-fifth year the mortgagor was to get the benefit of one-half the
income from the land, together with one-half the original rental. The
similarity between this elaborate scheme and the gage known in the
Talmud as "Kitzutha," type (5) above, is more than suggestive. It
will be recalled that according to most authorities this type of gage is
wholly free from the taint of usury and does not even involve moral
sanctions. The term of fifty years may have been suggested to the parties by the Biblical law of the Jubilee year. Indeed, the Talmud likens a
mortgage with deduction to the sale of land under the laws of the
Jubilee year.
Type (6) of the Talmudic gage, the so-called "mashkantha of
Sura" under which the debt was entirely extinguished at the end of a
specified term was, similarly used in England at a very early period.
Pollock and Maitland, in discussing the gage for years, remarked:
"Now in our records it is not always easy to mark off the gage for
years from those beneficial leases of which we have spoken above.
Both of them will serve much the same purpose, that of restoring
to a man a sum of money which he has.placed at the disposal of
another, though in the case of the beneficial lease there is nothing
that could be called a debt. As already said the beneficial lease
was common. It was particularly useful because it avoided the
scandal of usury."
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It will readily be seen from the above that the gage for years was
the exact counterpart of the "mashkantha of Sura," and that both were
used for the same purpose, namely, that of evading the prohibition of
usury.
Finally, an interesting reflection of Talmudic law is found in a
mortgage cited by Madox in his introduction to the Formulare Anglicanum. 42 A Jewish mortgagee leased the mortgaged property to the
mortgagor's wife. Madox calls this transaction singular, and singular
it certainly is to anyone not familiar with Hebrew law. But a reference
to the chapter in the Talmud dealing with usury will at once reveal the
reason for this peculiar, and apparently fictitious set-up.
4o. Round Ancient Charters, Pipe Roll Society Publ. vol. 10, p. 93.
-(2d ed. 1898) 121-2.

41. 2 PoLLoCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

42. P. XXII.

THE STORY OF THE MORTGAGE RETOLD

In this chapter 43 mention is made of a certain method of evading
the usury laws which the Talmudists condemn. This method consisted
in the mortgagee's leasing the property to the mortgagor at a fixed
annual rental. The instrument would recite that the borrower mortgaged the property to the lender, and that the latter leased it to the former. When the objection was raised to this form of instrument that
the lender could not at the same time and by the same instrument become
mortgagee and lessor, the formula was changed to read: The borrower
mortgaged the property to the lender and, after the lender had remained
in possession for some time, he leased it to the borrower. Still the Talmudists condemned this type of transaction as savoring of usury, because payments were made directly by the borrower to the lender. In
the Madox mortgage the mortgagor's wife was brought into the picture
44
in order to avoid direct payments by the borrower to the lender.
The writer has attempted to show that every type of gage which
was used by the Jews since the days of the Talmud was known and used
in medieval England. This complete parallelism, together with the
fact that there is hardly a phase of English medieval law, connected with
the creditor-debtor relationship, which has not been influenced by the
Jews, inescapably leads to the conclusion that the English copied these
devices from the Jews.
43. Baba Metzia, fol. 68a.
44. See id. fol. 69b, where it is said that usury laws apply only to direct payments
by the borrower to the lender.

